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Ethics As Grammar: 
A Note on Method and the Treatise on Good Works 
Don Irvine 
Master of Theology Student, Waterloo Lutheran Seminmy 
Waterloo, Ontario 
One criterion for the analysis of moral theory is that the method 
employed be appropriate to the content of the moral view to be 
analyzed. Philosophical methodology is not always conducive to 
theological analysis. ' Whatever else it is, Martin Luther's Treatise 011 
Good Work1 is primarily a theological document; it is generated in a 
world that John Webster describes as having a "moral ontology."3 
Contrary to modern ethical theory, the document is written against the 
background of an order of being, a metaphysical framework, in which 
moral agents and human action are identified in the ~ontext of an 
orientation to the Good construed in terms of the action of God. 
Morality on this view is neither a function of consciousness, 
culture or human autonomy; rather, it is an orientation to a creative 
divine agency understood as the complete origin, substance and 
fulfillment of all human action. The human person is envisaged as 
existing within a moral reality independent of attitude and 
disposition. The fact that such a moral orientation is characterized by 
views of revelation, faith, prayer, Christian action and commandment 
modulates what can count as an appropriate method of ethical 
analysis. 
Contemporary ethical methodologies very often preclude issues 
arising from the kind of moral ontology found in the Treatise 011 
Good Works. For example, modern ethical theory has been dominated 
by theories of either a teleological (Utilitarianism) or a deontological 
(Formalism) type. In both instances the interest is in the formation of 
a criterion for decision-making which appeals to either (a) the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number of people or (b) a 
categorical imperative which is a rule requiring action which every 
rational being, independent of aim, must observe. In both instances 
the emphasis falls on normative moral standards as determinants of 
decision-making, human autonomy, and the creation of a theory of 
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moral obligation based on some basic rule or principle. Such theories 
are of interest for theological ethicists but hardly capture the 
theological nuances ofthe moral world ofLuther. One ethicist names 
the issue thus: 
There is no reason to deny that the biblical record 
and Christian tradition manifest deontological and 
teleological tendencies, but it is mistaken to assume 
that Christian ethics requires us to choose either 
alternative or some combination of the two. For 
when we do so we inevitably tend to abstract the 
Christian "ethic" from its rationale by subordinating 
theological convictions to prior formal patterns of 
ethical argument.4 
An interesting alternative to Utilitarian and Formalist views is 
found in those contemporary theorists acquainted with the views of 
Aristotle and Aquinas who evince an interest in virtue and the ethics 
of character. The work of Alasdair Maclntyre,S for example, has 
excited Christian theologians who found much of interest in new 
themes such as practice, human agency, the role of narrative and 
community in moral formation. Other writers emerged who have 
sought to apply the views of Ludwig Wittgenstein to matters 
theological. In 1985 James C. Edward in his perceptive book Ethics 
Without Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Moral Life ( 1982) claims 
that Wittgenstein's central concern throughout his philosophical career 
was ethics, a "mystical" sphere because its content cannot be said or 
stated but only shown. While theological concerns did not loom large 
in Edward's analysis, such was not the case with Fergus Kerr,6 who 
called for a radical revision in our thinking about moral psychology. 
His view was a serious study of Wittgenstein 's method of linguistic 
analysis and its implications for traditional views of rational 
autonomy, theistic argument and the nature of the self/soul. Kerr's use 
ofWittgenstein's method to address important theological and moral 
issues has been extended by a contemporary writer, Brad Kallenberg1 
who offers a more extensive analysis of the Theological Ethics of 
Stanley Hauerwas under aspects ofWittgenstein. One year prior to the 
publication of Kallenberg's book, James McClendon published the 
third volume of his Systematic Theology in which Chapter Six is 
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entitled "Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Christian in Philosophy."R 
Apparently, Wittgenstein has been of interest to some theologians. 
Grammar of Theology 
Is it even likely that some aspects ofWittgenstein's linguistic method 
can offer assistance in understanding the theology of Luther s 
Treatise on Good Works? There is reason to think so. Wittgenstein 
himself made reference to theology draw attention to the use of 
language. In the Philosophical Investigations he states: 
One ought to ask, not what images are or what 
happens when one imagines anything, but how the 
word "imagination [Vorstellung]" is used. But that 
does not mean that I want to talk only about words. 
For the question as to the nature (Wesen) of the 
imagination is as much about the word 
"imagination" as my question is. And I am only 
saying that this question is not to be decided -
neither for the person who does the imagining, nor 
for anyone else - by pointing; nor yet by a 
description of any process. The first question also 
asks for a word to be explained but it makes us 
expect a wrong kind of answer. Essence (Wesen) is 
expressed by grammar.Q 
The next comment attends to certain elements of grammar, 
language and ostensive definition which is then followed by the 
remark: "Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is. 
(Theology as grammar.)" 10 Wittgenstein's point is that simply asking 
what ideas or images are, is to construe the inquiry as one where we 
seek to locate them by introspection assuming that such words 
denote. But this often becomes a source of philosophical confusion. 
To propose that we understand these words by considering how we 
use them in conversation about the inner life evokes the response that 
we are talking only about "words" rather than the thing itself. But, as 
Fergus Kerr claims, Wittgenstein's point is that questions about the 
inner life are not settled in this manner at all; the answer lies in a 
careful inspection of the kinds of things that we are permitted to say 
given the rules of the conversation. 11 The kind of object that a thing 
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is will come out in the kind of things that it is appropriate to say about 
it. This applies to the words "God" and "soul" as well as 
"imagination." To explain what the word "God" means we have to 
listen to what it is permissible to say about the subject. 
Wittgenstein had previously noted that we might often give up 
explaining words such as "God" or "soul" ostensively, by pointing; 
we don't give up explaining them in substantival terms. He says: 
Luther said that theology is the grammar of the word 
"God." I interpret this to mean that an investigation 
of the word would be a grammatical one. For 
example, people might dispute about how many 
anns God had, and someone might enter the dispute 
by denying that one could talk about arms of God. 
This would throw light on the use of the word. What 
is ridiculous or blasphemous also shows the 
grammar of the word. 1 ~ 
This account seems right. Theology in fact has typically involved 
much critical reflection on what is said about the divine. Theology 
certainly involves learning what may rightly be said and what has to 
be excluded people typically involves critical reflection of what 
people can appropriately say about the divine. Indeed, on 
Wittgenstein 's view of theological grammar the entire Treatise on 
Good Works can be construed as an attempt to remedy aberrant 
theological usage by recalling discourse about good works to its 
proper theological context. 
In what sense does Wittgenstein mean that "theology is the 
grammar of the word 'God"' and how does this reflect on Luther's 
uniquely theological view about human action? Brad Kallenberg 
alludes to a remark by Wittgenstein, "How words are understood is 
not told by words alone (Theology)," and introduces it with the 
statement: "The suggestion that communication requires self-
involving participation of speakers in the host fonn of life has 
interesting implications for Wittgenstein's view of religious 
language." One implication, according to Kallenberg, is that crossing 
the communication gap requires direct participation in that form of 
life in which the concept functions. He describes this as becoming 
familiar with the "grammar of such a concept" before engaging in 
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/4
Ethics As Grammar 85 
conversation." It is, as Kallenberg puts it, " ... the necessity of a self-
involving participation in a given form of life for cultivating the skill 
of hearing the connections between a sentence and appropriate 
aspects of its context .... " 13 
Now the term "grammar" is used by Luther in the Lectures on 
Galatians and his remark on Galatians 3: 11 speaks of an explanation 
"according to a new and theological grammar" while on verse 3: 15 
he speaks about consulting the grammar - "not the moral grammar 
but the theological grammar." 1 ~ In an excellent study ofLuther's view 
of theological and revelatory language, Risto Saarinen11 notes that 
Johann Eck remarked that Luther believed grammar to be the most 
important part of philosophy. Eck is referring to Luther's theses in 
Conclusiones tractantes, a libri philosphorum sint utiles aut inutiles 
ad theologiam where Luther states that the holy doctrine of theology 
is conveyed by words so the science of grammar is the most 
important of the arts for propagating theology. 1" Saarinen also notes 
Luther's insistence "that the student of theology should not study the 
rules for putting words together on the basis of philosophical 
textbooks but ought to become acquainted with the everyday use of 
the language."17 The art of theological grammar must be distinguished 
from philosophical grammar because of the presence of unusual 
subject matter, the new entity (nova res). Luther insists that the way 
of understanding this new entity and the modes of speaking about its 
propet1ies must be unique, although these new ways and modes are 
nevertheless conveyed by the normal, everyday use of language. 
This meant, according to Saarinen, that grammar can never 
simply be a speculative endeavour, a formal or syntactic discipline of 
classifying signs, carried out by scholastics. Rather, the specific art of 
each grammar is determined by its use of the words and, accordingly, 
by the signification of those words. This, as Saarinen rightly 
determines, is to give priority to the semantic and pragmatic features 
of language. This means that grammar for Luther includes not only 
words in a language, their relations with other words, together with 
their meaning or application, but also the relation between words and 
the world as well as the relation of words to their users. The inclusion 
of these pragmatic and semantic features and the unusual subject 
matter together compose a unique Grammatico theologica which is 
what Luther has in mind when he aims to outline an "alternative 
theological semantic which he often refers to as a 'new' grammar." 18 
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If Saarinen's analysis obtains, then Luther's theological grammar 
is a complex of elements: It includes a speaker's use of ordinary 
language in some context of reference or meaning, the relations 
between words and what they are about (semantics) as well as the 
relation of speakers and words (pragmatics). Since Luther does not 
systematize an overview of theological grammar, it would be of 
assistance to provide an interpretation which could further an 
understanding of human action implicit in "Good works." This is a 
case of particular interest since it is a major theme in The Treatise on 
Good Works, and Luther makes it very clear that there is a unique 
usage, a special theological grammar of"doing," properly understood 
as a "doing with faith." 19 But we do require an understanding of the 
theological grammar of "doing with faith" which is a unique way of 
understanding the use of ordinary words? 
One contemporary proposal to capture the key elements in 
Wittgenstein's analysis of meaning germane to this unique 
understanding is that offered by Brad Kallenberg. He begins with an 
analysis of the concept of "fonn" found in the developing views of 
Wittgenstein from his early to later writings. Navigating a diversity of 
interpretations, he indicates the earliest use of "fonn" to denote the 
logical structure of reality in the Tractatus; while after 1931 the word 
became associated with the phrase "language games" which spoke of 
the irreducible social character of human life. The notion "fonn of 
life" then began to predominate in Wittgenstein's later views and in 
the Philosophical Grammar "fonn" becomes analogous to "grammar" 
that "describes the use of words in the language."20 Meaning in this 
context has to do with rules of use upon which speakers agree. 
Kallenberg cites Wittgenstein: "We say that we understand its [a 
word's] meaning when we know its use, but we've also said that the 
word 'know' doesn't denote a state of consciousness. That is, the 
grammar of the word 'know' isn't the grammar of a 'state of 
consciousness,' but something different. And there is only one way to 
learn it to watch how the word is used in practice. "21 
The rules that govern a speaker's use of language are inextricably 
bound up with the manner of their daily lives - with what 
Wittgenstein calls their "form of 1 i fe" - the stream of I i fe and thought 
in which words have meaning. But skill is required for the language 
user who seeks fluency and this is not simply a matter of vocabulary 
and sense (Speculative grammar), for "how words are understood is 
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not told by words alone (theology);" rather, it is practice which gives 
words their sense. For example, the correct use of the word "God" 
requires that one must be familiar with the place that the language-
games of prayer and confession play in the activities of praying and 
confessing. 
On this interpretation ofWittgenstein's "form of life," Kallenberg 
proposes that meaning include at least the following elements: 
(1) Meaning is a function of the vocable context. 
That is, "A sentence gains its sense from the immediate context of the 
language-game in which the sentence is located." The example offered 
is the sentence "All men are brutes," which has a very different nuance 
in the language-game oftheology than in the language game ofajilted 
lover. The language-game, however, is but a part of the flow of an 
ongoing conversation where the application and interpretation of 
words tluctuate.22 Another writer notes that the appeal to the language 
game also captures Wittgenstein 's notion that words are related to the 
world in that they are a part of the world; they come together in 
activities, language-games, constitutive of practices that comprise the 
human world. McClendon observes that Wittgenstein presented a 
series of imaginary games to enable his students to grasp a way of 
construing word-world relations in real life: 
In one game, a primitive builder instructs his 
assistant by ordering any of four needed stones: 
blocks, pillars, slabs, or beams ... In another, children 
play word-games as they learn their native language 
... Again, a shopper secures "five red apples" from 
the green grocer ... Or a military commander gives 
battle orders and receives reports ... In each of these 
examples there is a relation to the way things are, yet 
crucially, these relations include the deeds and needs 
and intention of the participants. No game can even 
be understood as a human activity (i.e., no proper 
sense of 'meaning' can arise from its words) apart 
from the forms of life, practices such as building, 
shopping, playing or fighting, that make up human 
endeavours. Together these practices constitute our 
world.~ 1 
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"Meaning" in these dimensions is depicted not only in terms of 
the sense of vocable but in terms of a more inclusive relation of 
words and world. 
(2) In addition to vocable context, Kallenberg notes that 
Wittgenstein used the term "surroundings" to signify the 
behavioural context, which contributes to the sense that a 
speaker gains from a sentence. 
Presumably, the allusion is to the existence of a multiple of language 
games in the person's linguistic community. For example, giving 
explanations is a correlate of requesting information or clarification; 
it presupposes a certain degree of I inguistic understanding on the part 
of the learner, e.g., the ability to ask for the meaning of a word, which 
requires training. The latter is a learning context presupposing 
recognition of an authority. Kallenberg cites Wittgenstein's example 
of a lie: "a lie has a peculiar surrounding," because one cannot 
announce an intention to tell a lie and then succeed in fooling anyone. 
Rather, a lie succeeds as an act of deception only when other 
behavioural components are in place: "Only when there is a relatively 
complicated pattern of life do we speak of pretence." A wry grin, 
averted eyes, a lush, a shuffle, and the game is upF~ 
(3) One readily understood behavioural component of grammar 
is gesture. 
Kallenberg cites a familiar Neapolitan behaviour of brushing the 
underneath of the chin with an outward sweep of the fingertips of one 
hand taken to indicate disgust or contempt. Fergus Kerr who cites 
Wittgenstein notes this feature of gestures: 
In my heart I have determined on it. And one is even 
inclined to point to one's breast as one says it. 
Psychologically this way of speaking should be 
taken seriously. Why should it be taken less seriously 
that the assertion that belief [der Glaube] is a state of 
mind? (Luther: 'Faith [der Glaube] is under the left 
nipple. ')"25 
The point is that the gesture of laying a hand on one's chest when 
taking an oath is like the clutching on one's brow when solving a 
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problem; such gestures are not less serious than the view that faith is 
an inner state or a thought is in the head. Faith, like thought, is often 
visible. More obvious, however, gesturing has a manifest linguistic 
character since we often explain our understanding of a gesture by 
translation into words and the understanding of words by translating 
them into gesture. Like words, gestures are intertwined in a net of 
multifarious relationships. 
(4) Part of gesturing is the acknowledgement that one part of 
human behaviour consists of responses like the shedding of 
tears, gasping when endangered or beating one's breast. 
Kallenberg describes these gestures as" ... so basic that a perspicuous 
description of language can go no deeper than a record of these" and 
notes that Wittgenstein applied the epithet "primitive" " ... in order to 
emphasize their givenness for the functioning of language."~6 What is 
important here is that such gestures are not adopted to explain one's 
meanings; rather, they are one's meanings. They are gestures enacting 
faith, repentance, delight rather than 'real' states of mind having an 
obscure mental existence in the speaker's mind. In addition to these 
responses - as well as the vocable and behavioural - part of the 
weave of human behaviour, is learned, social and conventional. 
Children do not learn that chairs exist; they learn to climb on chairs, 
sit in chairs, play musical chairs, etc. Using language is anchored in 
our way of living and acting and only by involvement in the pattern 
of living can one learn to use the word "chair" with facility. 
Kallenberg concludes: 
Thus the "stage-setting" or "grammar" upon which 
successful linguistic interplay depends involves not 
only the relation of words within a sentence, but also 
the relation between the sentence and the rest of the 
language-game, the relationship of this language-
game to the rest of the conversation (hence, to the 
whole system of language-games), and the place of 
this conversation in the activities (both primitive and 
conventional) of our daily lives. This complex weave 
of contextual connection is what Wittgenstein wants 
his readers to glimpse in the phrase, "form of life." ~7 
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Here, the use of language is anchored in our way of living and 
acting so the use of a language - its sense and significance - is 
constitutive of the speaker's world and reflects a community's form 
of life. In sum, this is a view which retains vocables and linguistic 
syntax (scholasticism) but also captures the unique uses of ordinary 
language in its pragmatic and semantic dimensions (Luther) and 
hence is able to convey the nova res. 
If this account is taken as a reasonable interpretation of the use 
and significance, which Saarinen identifies as the uniqueness feature 
of theological usage, then there is material content to Luther's view 
of "theological grammar." It is to claim that the grammar of a word 
(i.e., the pattern of its use) cannot be conceived apart from the way 
the surrounding social group lives, acts, speaks, sees, hears, and 
thinks. There is a twofold dimension to theological uniqueness here: 
the first lies in the presupposition that the social group in which 
contextualization occurs is ecclesial community. Secondly, Luther is 
clear in his account of human action that it be understood 
theologically - that is, be delineated clearly from other ways of 
thinking and speaking. Hence Luther writes: 
Therefore we have to rise higher in theology with the 
word 'doing,' so that it becomes altogether new. For 
just as it becomes something different when it is taken 
from the natural area into the moral, so it becomes 
something much more different when it is transferred 
from philosophy and from Law into theology ... 
'[D]oing' is always understood in theology as doing 
with faith, so that doing with faith is another sphere 
and a new realm, so to speak, one that is different from 
moral doing. When we theologians speak about 
'doing,' therefore, it is necessary that we speak about 
doing with faith, because in theology we have no right 
reason and good will except in faith. l8 
Now in the Treatise on Good Works Luther does seek to provide 
content and specificity to this notion of a theological grammar of 
"doing with faith." He insists that good works are understood not by 
reference to the alms or plans of the agent but by the discourse of 
divine command. He writes: 
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The first thing to know is that there are no good 
works except those works God has commanded .... 
Therefore, whoever wants to know what good works 
are as well as doing them needs to know nothing 
more than God's commandments .... Accordingly, 
we have to learn to recognize good works from the 
commandments of God, and not from the 
appearance, size, or number of the works 
themselves, nor from the opinion of men of human 
law or custom, as we see has happened and still 
happens because of our blindness and disregard of 
the divine commandments.:!') 
91 
This understanding of theological (not moral) grammar suggests 
that The Treatise on Good Works be viewed as an attempt to revise 
the received use of good works by reinstating a contextual connection 
with the command of God that determines proper usage. 
Another implication with respect to theological ethics is that 
actions, which are the subject of moral or ethical appraisals, are only 
properly theological because of their orientation to the command of 
God. That is, theological ethics to be theological is oriented to and 
focussed upon the command of God. Now "command" in this usage 
is hot understood as a Kantian imperative, a universal moral 
prescription, mandating the enforcement of divine determination on 
human agency. Luther's exposition and the etymology of Torah 
suggest that 'the law' is here understood as "to give direction," "to 
point the way." It is interpreted this way by George Lindbeck who 
notes that Luther does not regard divine command in the Decalogue 
as law but" ... instruction or teaching (doctrina) of the type which can 
variously be termed praeceptum Gebot, and mandatum. "30 In this 
respect it is interesting that there is no polemic against law in Luther's 
exposition of the Ten Commandments. Rather, the explanation of the 
Decalogue is shaped in pastoral discourse about the life of practice in 
faith, prayer and worship. It is this kind of discourse which enables 
the personal appropriation implicit in the focus or orientation to a 
divine personal reality. This reality which, though separate, enables 
that responsiveness in human agency which generates what Luther 
calls a "simple, single, goodness" in good works without which they 
are mere colour, glitter and deceit. 11 
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According to Luther, the orientation of human action to the 
divine command involves a special place for the first commandment. 
Indeed, it is the special role of the first command coupled with the 
concept of practice that displays the uniqueness of theological 
grammar. Luther states: 
Because this commandment is the very first of all 
commandments and the highest and the best [the 
one] from which all others must proceed, in which 
they must exist and abide, and by which they must be 
judged and assessed. Compared with this work the 
other good works are like the other commandments 
would be if they were without the first and as ifthere 
were no God.32 
There are positive duties involved here. The second 
commandment to honour God's name is not merely to forbid cursing, 
the seeking of approval, fame and honour/ 3 rather, we are to use 
God's name properly addressing God in praise, preaching and singing 
and " ... in every way laud and magnify God's glory, honour and 
name."34 But Luther also identifies a specific relation because he 
claims that the first commandment is indispensable to the second 
commandment because "This, like all the other works, cannot be 
done without faith."35 The teaching of the third commandment to 
hallow God's name also" ... compels faith to call upon God's name 
.... So faith comes right through the third commandment, and back 
into the second again." Luther states the interconnection: "See what 
a pretty golden ring these three commandments and their works make 
of themselves! See how the second commandment emerges from the 
first commandment and its subject, faith, and runs into the third, and 
the third in turn works back through the second into the first!"36 
So the faith of the first commandment coheres all 
commandments and this also applies to the second table of the 
Decalogue, which Involves our relation to our neighbour. Honouring 
father and mother, for example, is also an expression and exercise of 
faith without which" ... no work is a genuine living work: it is neither 
good nor acceptable."37 But honour is never an indiscreet deference to 
authority because such authority is delimited by what God expects in 
the first three commandments. That all the commandments are 
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included in the faith of the first commandment means that it is not 
enough to refrain from doing harm to our neighbour. On the contrary, 
it is expected that we return good for evil, neither thinking nor 
speaking evil of them, praying and thinking the best for them.38 Once 
again, faith is the connecting link of this commandment to the first 
commandment: "For if we do it in faith and bring faith to bear upon 
it never doubting God's grace and favor ... Jt will be quite easy for 
him to be gracious and favourable to his neighbor."19 
Luther's exposition does not presume that the so-called "moral 
commandments" of the second table are conceptually separable from 
the ostensibly "religious" commandments of the first table. Indeed, 
each command in the Decalogue is conceptually inseparable, that is, 
interconnected because each is sequenced in a manner which relates 
it to the first command which establishes" ... the aseity, the absolute 
primacy and the sheer gratuity of divine action: at the beginning of 
the Decalogue stands the divine self-definition and its radically 
exclusive demand."4" Its role is strategic in governing the type and 
direction of the explanation offered in the other commands and as 
such it functions as a meta-command; it indicates a general direction 
for a whole range of behaviour by relating everything by faith to the 
one God. In sum, Luther assumes that the precepts that follow the 
first commandment in the Decalogue are but a commentary on the 
faith implicit in the first and great commandment. 
Theologians interested in the moral dimensions of the Decalogue 
have proposed that the commandments are readily understood as 
associated with particular moral practices.4 ' That is, to issue the 
Commandment is to presuppose a practice and to show a way of 
conduct with regard to that practice. The law forbidding adultery and, 
by implication, other sorts of sexual license, can only have meaning 
in a culture that practices marriage. This promotes the claim that the 
individual commands are interrelated as practices, which is to say 
that Luther's interpretation of the law requires that we assume the 
existence of a people who are part of a community constituted by 
interconnected practices which make the law serve the purpose of 
worshipping God.41 Other practices are involved here: to issue the 
command to honour fathers and mothers makes no sense except in a 
community where there are fathers, that is, where there is a system of 
kinship making the role of fathers and other relatives socially visible. 
Stealing presupposes the practice of stewardship of property. 
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The interrelation of the commandments coupled with the role of 
the first commandment allows the discernment of certain ethical 
relationships. Of course, this is no guarantee that refraining from 
bearing false witness ensures that we will be trustworthy and faithful 
in marriage. At the same time, just as we are only able to name and 
identify violence by discovering the practices of peace in which we 
are embedded, so we are only able to name, identify, and see the 
connection between our sins by the practices that constitute a 
community made possible by the faithfulness of worshipping God. 
Similarly, it is good to speak the truth, but without acknowledging the 
One who is truth, it is problematic to understand how any human 
speech could be truthful and trustworthy. Again, one interpreter 
develops the connection between truth-speaking and stealing by 
showing how they are positive and negative witnesses to God's 
generosity and the "cause of covetousness is distrust, while on the 
other hand, the cause of generosity is faith." Stephen Fowl quotes 
Luther's statement that stealing" ... fights not only against theft 'and 
robbery, but against every kind of sharp practice which men 
perpetrate against each other in matters of worldly goods. For 
instance, greed, usury, overcharging, counterfeit goods, short 
measure, short weight, and who could give an account of all the 
smart, novel, and sharp-witted tricks which daily increase in every 
trade."43 Fowl observes that such practices only manifest the fear that 
there will not be enough. Lying is fuelled by the same presumption 
that people do not have the time to learn how to speak truthfully to 
one another. 
So the interconnection of the commandments and the inclusion 
of the role of practices enable a theological grammar in which 
language use is constitutive of the speaker's world and reflects a 
community's form of life. It is to expose the material conditions of 
"how we should practice and use faith in all good works which 
Luther deemed to be his task in The Treatise on Good Works. 44 
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